

Gulf Cooperation Council States (GCC), Military power, between temporary alliances and Permanent joint Mechanisms.

Dr. Al-Rawashdeh Mohammad Salim,

*Associated Professor, International Relations, Al-Balqa'a Applied University,
Hashimit Kingdom Of Jordan- Amman.*

Abstract: *Since the beginning of the current decade, the pace of political developments and security variables accelerated in the Middle East dramatically; forcing indicators and the harbingers of a clear point of a fundamental change in the nature of interests and the quality of alliances that can be formed in the region in general, and the Arab world in particular. While each state in the region pursues its own approach to security and faces its own unique challenges, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE all share many of the same strategic priorities and security interests, and are allied together in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). All six states must react to the same major changes now taking place in their strategic environment.*

The Gulf War proved" the urgent need for strong collective defenses, in the Gulf region ... it is the security point of view, is the Kingdom, and its neighbors from the Gulf states, both integrated ... even if there was a military integration between the Kingdom and the Gulf states, to form the all powerful bloc, we are better to be able to defend ourselves, but we had the political weight, at the level of the region, but worldwide. The collective security, at the level of the Gulf States ... is imposed by the current circumstances, that the kingdom plays a prominent role, because of their greater potential and more numerous and several forces. Arab countries have become, particularly the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), is facing growing threats to national and regional stability and security, and turned to the potential challenges looming certain risk.

There are several reasons require from the Gulf Cooperation Council building and devote regional and international alliances States; in view of what these threats of attributes; the most important of all the threats which surrounding the region.

Gulf Determinants: The extent of success in the Gulf Arab states in achieving greater military cooperation among them, on a systematic and integrated foundations; as well as self-reliance in building its defense capabilities through a combination of advanced military technology and the qualified national cadres. In light of these determinants three scenarios for the future of collective military force to Gulf Arab states, an s follows Gulf- Gulf alliance: Gulf- Arabic Alliance, Gulf-regional expanded alliance.

Firmness storm" prove the ability of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to carry out the necessary steps to protect its borders and security.

Key words: *Gulf Cooperation Council, Arab world, security interests, security alliances.*

I. Introduction:

We have learned from the lessons of history that States and countries which are under threats of a common enemy, must unite their efforts to participate in the face of these threats, so was the case when the Arab nation faced the battle of the Crusades in the eleventh and twelfth centuries when Saladin succeeded in uniting the Egyptian armies, and Syria in the face of the Crusader armies ,as he succeeded in defeating them in the battle of Hittin in 1187, then recaptured Jerusalem after several months of this battle, The same thing did Saifuddin Qutuz , the ruler of Egypt when the Tatars swept of the countries of Asia and the East in the twelfth century, and he headed to the Gaza Strip, targeting to entry Egypt, when the Egyptian army faced them in Gaza and chased them until the main battle occurred against them in the famous battle named Ein Goliath after Qutuz secured the movements of the Egyptian army in an agreement with the princes of Palestine and the Levant, and if we move into the modern era of European countries in the forties of the last century were under the invasions of Nazi German armies led by Hitler, who occupied several major countries, notably France. What did the European countries do? All of them allied with the United States to hit the Nazi forces and expel them from their countries to Germany, where the Nazi state were dropped in August 1945 and this included the Alliance of contradictory ideology of states like communism Russia, but all of them were gathered together and were united against the Nazi threats.

On the Arab level in the modern era, perhaps the biggest victory of the Egyptian army in the war of October 1973 with the participation of the Syrian army with it in the war against Israel, and the forced Israel to fight on two fronts to reverse the security theory that refuses to do so, the best proof of the importance of the Arab military cooperation in the face of a common enemy, especially since other Arab countries participated in the war efforts of another, including Yemen, which helped Egypt to close the Straits of Tiran, including Saudi Arabia, which used oil as a weapon in the battle against America and Europe, and Algeria, which helped finance the compensation for the loss of weapons and equipment as well as the participation of Kuwait, Sudan, and Morocco troops to secure the strategic depth and the military balance in the theater of operations.

From here, we make sure that the importance of the Arab military cooperation - and even its inevitability - between the Arab countries to confront common hostilities in our time, in terms of terrorism, which hits the corners of the Arab countries, and Iran, which want to lead the empire Persian at the expense of the Arab countries, and Turkey, which wants to restore the old Ottoman Empire, and Israel, which wants to be the only regional superpower in the region and the establishment of the State of Greater Israel at the expense of Arab States and the support of America that wants to extend its force to the region through a new Middle East project in a manner of creative chaos, anarchy or chaos by creating and helping extremist, sectarian and religious groups.

There is no doubt that, the first and second Gulf War and the crisis of Yemen represented by (storm firmness), created new conditions in the region, they showed new alliances, some of them ended up at the end of the war, and some of them continues. These crises have represented a serious threat, to varying degrees, higher national interests, values and key external policies of countries in the region, and many of the actors outside, especially the major powers. Therefore, the parties, who came out of this war, the victors, rush thinking of how to save the region from a similar crisis to that which emerged from the Gulf War. Parties who won the war began to seek and build a security system, or at least the security arrangements, to ensure that this sensitive and vital region, of the world, its stability, and its reservation from serious threat, which caused the two devastating wars, in a short period of time.

The researcher starts from the distinction between the terms "coalitions and alliances"; clarifies that where alliances are formed through the political will and harmony of the countries in which they participate, and often those alliances are temporary; so ends the completion of the task, which was formed for. The military alliances take the form of permanence; they are established under international treaties or agreements, include precise institutional structure of the alliance and the nature, scope and membership conditions and quality.

The researcher goes on discussing the nature of the security challenges faced by the Arab region, specifically the Gulf region, and necessity required by these challenges to build a joint military force. He believes that the most important of these challenges lies in the expansion of Iranian influence in the region and its extension to the immediate vicinity of the Gulf States; as well as in the growing threat of terrorism, especially with the rapid rise of some extremist organizations that have become pose an existential challenge to the nation-state.

This paper outlines the determinants of the future of the Gulf military force of Iran and the Gulf relations after the settlement of Iran's nuclear program. As follows:

The Gulf determinant: The extent of success in the Gulf Arab states in achieving greater military cooperation among them, as the founders of systematic and integrated manner.

The Arab Gulf: linked to the nature of the internal restrictions that may be exposed to Arab countries actors' candidate for any future regional alliance.

Regional and international Gulf: relates to the quality of the changes that may occur to the current patterns of relations between regional and international powers concerned with the security of the region.

Finally, the researcher tries to explore three scenarios for the future of collective military force to the Gulf Arab States:

-Gulf- Gulf alliance: through-Gulf Gulf military cooperation system in the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

-Gulf- Arab Alliance: across the Gulf States to join the proposed formed to the joint Arab military force.

- -Regional - Gulf alliance: the Gulf States from its nucleus, as well as on the security of the Gulf Arab states such as Egypt, Jordan and Turkey, Arab and regional countries.

Gulf-Iranian relations after the signing of the Iranian nuclear program.

Geopolitical situation in the Middle East in general and the Gulf region in particular, constitutes a catalyst to build an Arab-Arab or Arab-regional alliances.

This indicates the current geopolitical landscape in the Middle East, including attendant security threats, to fundamental shifts in key actors and the roles of alliances and interests, which will have repercussions on the present and the future of regional and international balances; especially in the Gulf region.

The application of inductive theory evokes moments of geopolitical area starting with the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 through the moments that followed the successive wars of the region since 1948 and up to the present moment. More importantly, such as the moment where the reflected factors cannot be separated or

acquitted of preparation for fueling the moment Arabic change. With the need to review the effects of external factor, especially American projects in the region ranging from "Baghdad Pact" projects "Greater Middle East" and after the "new" and before them "change the map of the Middle East Project".

Added to this the "Wiki leaks" leaks plus the usual destination for the CIA. That gave Reuters exclusive periods of time deposits of leaks relating to political risks in the list of Arab countries. Without forgetting US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's remarks since received her position about freedoms, particularly the freedom of the Internet. Add to take over the US development agency responsible for financing Arab blogosphere and organizations supervising it and against it. This without excluding the repercussions of the secession of southern Sudan and the States affected by the practices and policies of Mubarak, an African or Arab policies. This inductive theory leads us to warn of the exploitation of the Arab revolutions to achieve the steps to enable hegemony on the Arab region and these steps include:

Change the map of the Middle East: According to intelligence report mentioned in the bulletin "Foreign Report," the US general strategy in 2002 that among US security interests in the region, after the US campaign in Afghanistan, the conclusion of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East settles with redrawing the new political map of the region, which ignites regional and international conflicts, according to the American plan, while the US remains a concern in the region is to maintain Israel's military superiority and the creation of small entities in the region to maintain that superiority.

Insisting on US Middle East Project: This project complies with the strategic direction of the Baghdad Alliance is a project so that an updated version for the Baghdad Alliance. Where the common goal of the two projects is the establishment of an alliance friend to Washington take care to protect its interests in the Middle East. With the fall of the Soviet Union, which ended the default logic of international alliances difference? So that NATO was forced to amend the defense strategy and turn it into an offensive to justify the continuity of the missing after the fall of the Warsaw Alliance with the Soviet Union. The American project for the Middle East has launched and entitled "significant" impact of American power philosophy adopted by Bush and the Conservatives.

Dissemination of Democracy American models: Americans theorists have tried to incorporation of the project by providing the US occupied Iraq a model of democracy. But the outbreak of the Iraqi resistance and continuity of the model turned to be reversed. To move trying to build American model to Lebanon and active following the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. But traditional Lebanese pluralism prevented the success of the Lebanese model as well.

Strategic Analysts raise the Arab revolutions as alternatives to American democracy in the region. And their opinion is supported by their role with reference to "Wiki leaks" in discovering toxic and poisoning secrets of some of the Arab rulers.

This paper is an attempt to analyze the nature of the current regional and international developments in light of the process of "storm firmness", and trying to monitor the consequences arising from there, also, it seeks to explore its consequences on the future of the political situation in the light of existing tensions.

II. The differences between temporary and permanent alliances.

With the increasing threats, risks and hostilities against Arab national security in the country's national and regional levels from inside and outside, we have to set up a joint and effective Arab military force that is capable of meeting these challenges and work as a «spearhead» or «advanced detachment» of the Arab armies, after the usurp of the legitimate authority in some Arab countries - such as Libya and Yemen - in favor of strong hostile in regional and international circles, and President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, King Abdulla the second of Jordan and King Salman of Saudi Arabia sounding the alarm last November of 2014, calling for the formation of the power of fast Arab spread that responded to his proposal most of the Arab countries and endorsed by the last Arab Summit so that participating in this power is to be optional, with the chiefs of staff of the Arab armies, that have agreed to participate in a month to discuss the matter, to provide their report to meet the presidency of the Arab summit within three months, to include mechanisms for implementation of the summit's decision in this regard, Iraq, Algeria, Qatar, and Tunisia has opposed the resolution for fear that such joint of Arab force maybe a party to any internal disputes both within the State under threat or between themselves or other Arab countries, which is currently happen in situation of Yemen, Libya and Syria.

It is clear that the Yemeni crisis where "the Militias Houthis" and ex-president Saleh troops, try to siege Aden to prevent the return of President Mansur Hadi, this situation imposed priority to discuss the issue of the joint Arab force and approved at the summit, given that the formation of this force is part of a military solution to the crisis of Yemen options, and that the only solution remaining become to end it after they all peaceful means failed where dialogues lasted several months, and proved to be that the "Houthis", want to take advantage of the time in the expansion of their deployment and their sphere of influence in Yemen, and to get more arms, ammunition and equipment from Iran, stockpiling in the mountains of Yemen and prepare for a long war, not to mention their threats exposed to overwhelm Saudi Arabia and to reach the holy Islamic sites in Mecca and

Medina and the extension of their dominance on them, which is implemented in their deployment of ballistic missiles and artillery units geared toward southern Saudi Arabia, where-Huthis became an imminent threat and a reality, especially as in 2011, when Houthis attacked the Saudi border guards in the regions of Jizan and Najran nearby North of Yemen and the Houthis stronghold in Saada.

An Introductory note should be referred to in order to prevent confusion of concepts and boost the ambiguity of terminology; where researcher concept of "alliances or coalitions" is used to refer to the military and security cooperation patterns that combine a number of countries to face a danger, or to address the actual or potential threat.

And these alliances are formed through the political will of the countries in which they agree to participate, and often these coalitions are temporary; so that it will be ended by the completion of the task, which was formed for it, which may be reconfigured again if necessary.

Among the most prominent examples of this contemporary alliances: the international coalition that the US-led invasion to liberate Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion on 2 August / August 1990; where coalition launched Operation "Desert Storm" in the 17 of January 1991; which lasted until 26 February of the same year.

The military alliances shall take the form of permanence; where they are established under international treaties or agreements, include precise institutional structure of the alliance in nature, scope and membership conditions and quality, also includes obligations and rights of its member states.

As stipulated clearly in the establishment of the military alliance on military vehicles of the Treaty; including: Systems Command and control, and the size, type of the forces, and the nature of the participation of each member state, and the controls of increasing or reducing these forces, and the systems of work, and plans for deployment, the headquarters pinned down, as well as the nature of the military doctrine of the alliance, and others.

Among the most prominent examples of military alliances in the modern era: "NATO", the Warsaw Pact, and the Baghdad Pact.

III. The need to build a Gulf defense force military joint.

Oman has not only initiative of the Arab Gulf states, separately, to rebuild its military power and defensive ability; lifted up the banner of the call for the construction of a common military defense force, strong 100 thousand soldiers, from the citizens of the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). And Sultan Qaboos bin Said of Oman, provided in his report of this force (constructed goal from its inception), in the GCC summit in Kuwait in December 1991. There is no doubt that the establishment of such a force, will increase the military capabilities of the Gulf Cooperation Council; it will be a transition from the stage, the joint force is only a token force, do not have any capability to deter, as is the case with force, "Peninsula Shield" to the stage, you were the joint force strategic and defensive important significance. But, there are many requirements, human, financial and technical, necessitated by the construction of the power process. The construction of this huge power, of limited densely populated of Gulf Arab states standards, will require a change in the recruitment and mobilization system. Where the proportion of Gulf Arab states of its citizens only 25%, of the total population. Keen on limiting the force or strain on citizens by birth only, in this case, each of the Sultanate of Oman and Saudi Arabia must contribute the bulk of construction.

The process of the formation of this force also raises practical problems, such as determining features of a clear command and control systems, communications, and decision-making authority regarding moving troops. The GCC states have succeeded in finding solutions to these problems, based on practical, realistic, realizing the common interest; May this be the joint force, to be built, a very important building block in the construction of a deterrent force of the Gulf Arab states.

Oman is leading the trend, which calls for self-reliance. This represents an orientation Supreme Security Committee, formed by the Gulf Cooperation Council, headed by Sultan Qaboos, the Sultan of Oman. This committee held several meetings, the chiefs of staff of the Gulf Cooperation Council forces. At a meeting of chiefs of staff of the armies of the Gulf Cooperation Council, in Muscat, in October 22, 1991, they put their vision to form a force from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), to be independent, and traded its leadership and not smaller than one hundred thousand soldiers, from the men of the GCC countries, and identifies leaders Headquarters pinned down. And raise the chiefs of staff's recommendation, in this regard, to Sultan Qaboos bin Said. At the twelfth summit of the Council, in Kuwait (23 December 25 1991), Sultan Qaboos made a detailed strategic report, in relation to this joint force, known, later, as the "Unified GCC army." But the summit has not made a specific decision, with regard to that report, which was encouraged by Sultanate of Oman, Sultan Qaboos himself. The final statement was limited thanks to the Sultan Qaboos, for the effort to put in the preparation of the strategic report. Later, Abdullah Bishara, the Secretary-General (former) of the Council, announced the idea of "Unified GCC army", put forward by Sultan Qaboos, "referred to the study," which means reservation of the idea implicitly; it is what will make sure in most of the meetings, which considered the idea again, especially meetings of the chiefs of staff, and defense ministers, the thirteenth Summit, which was held in Abu Dhabi (21 December 23, 1992).

Reservation of the idea also appeared, early, in Muscat, on October 22, 1991. On October 2, 1991, Yousef Alawi, Minister of State for Omani Foreign Affairs, traveled to Riyadh, where he met with His Royal Highness, Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz, the Second Deputy Prime Minister, and the Minister of Defense and Aviation and Inspector General of Saudi Arabia, Oman to discuss the proposal, on the establishment of "Unified GCC army." Then later it became clear, that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, has expressed reservations of Oman proposal, at a meeting of the chiefs of staff (27 August 28, 1991), in Muscat. Therefore, the next meeting of the chiefs of staff, which was scheduled to take place on October 2, 1991, was not held, the same day, in which Alawi visited Riyadh, to discuss the matter with the Saudi defense minister.

After the proposal submission of the chiefs of staff, formally, to Sultan Qaboos, after their meeting in Muscat, in October 22, 1991, took the feedback, conservative and outs, appear in turn, declared mistrust the possibility of the implementation of the idea, or the usefulness of this army; or confirming the reservation of the idea Cooperation Council granted authority over the powers of the Member States, wishing to adhere to the absolute sovereignty, without any diminution, while continuing to curtail the role of the Council as a framework for the organization of joint cooperation only, between Member States.

In-trial meetings to Kuwait summit (in December 1991), which held the ministers of defense and foreign ministers, did not want any support or support for the idea of a "unified army." The only statement the ministers of defense (November 20, 1991), in Doha, the report of the "continuation of the relevant committees to consider all the issues, in the light caused by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait experience, and draw the best lessons from this experience, in order to achieve the principle of collective security."

two days before the summit, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, Kuwaiti Foreign Minister (former), told a news speech, he described the idea of a "unified Gulf army", as "a wonderful and an excellent idea, but the GCC countries, are not prepared to that now, and they may need to thirty or forty years to come, until it will be realized. "

Decisions of the Abu Dhabi summit, have confirmed, prior and subsequent, of meetings of the chiefs of staff and defense ministers that the Sultanate of Oman, stand, alone, behind the idea of joint military force.

the Sultanate of Oman tried to convince the GCC countries of the importance of the implementation of this idea, developed by the Chief of Staff of Oman, confirming that it is "a strong foundation for protecting the security and stability of the Gulf," and that the Gulf Cooperation Council, has the power, human and material, and the management needed to build such a force. And he gave every reason, enough to convince the implementation of the idea, the most important that any country, no matter how its own strength, cannot, by itself, address the aggression; any country it will not be able to pay full forces to the defense of another state, the time the country itself will be in face of the aggression.

The Gulf reservation of the idea of the formation of this army, and the Declaration postponed for a further period to come, namely, which set the unified security system, and collective security system, to the group of self-security systems, and every state, from which, works according to its perspective, according to their potential for collective action, Since not opposed to its responsibility to protect its security and stability.

But the reservation of the idea of "Unified GCC Army" sent, again, the idea of retaining troops "Peninsula Shield" and developed, to be the nucleus of the army, at a future stage. Nasser and with this idea in particular Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain. While Qatar had withdrawn its troops, two hundred, of that force, after border disputes with Saudi Arabia, in October 14, 1992.

The support of Riyadh idea of supporting "Peninsula Shield" forces, but for refusing the idea of Oman, to build a "unified Gulf army," because of social and logistical problems, the problems of command and control, must be taken into account and places of concentration of units of this army, and trends in his work, it must be determined specifically accurate.

In the words of Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Khalifa, Bahrain's Minister of Defense, Bahrain Supported the idea of developing "Peninsula Shield" forces, on the grounds that it "Unified GCC army," which was supported by Bahrain, as well.

"Peninsula Shield" forces have also enjoyed the support of Kuwait, which it found it as an alternative to the "unified army"; that rely on the US military to guarantee the protection of its own security, as well as other military agreements, with Britain and France. Gulf Cooperation Council adopted the idea, officially; the defense ministers meeting decided in Kuwait (14 November 15, 1992), continue to maintain the "Peninsula Shield".

Sheikh Ali Salem Al-Sabah, Kuwaiti Defense Minister, announced, a decision regarding the formation of Gulf military force, through the "Peninsula Shield"; which linking command and control, through the Joint Command. This position is confirmed Lt. Gen. Saleh natured, Saudi land forces commander, said in a statement, in which he said: "The GCC is serious about strengthening its forces from the force," Peninsula Shield ". He also stressed that His Royal Highness, Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, said: "The Unified Strategy, the Gulf Cooperation Council, in the field of defense, will be in support of force," Peninsula Shield ", which he saw as an extension of the Gulf military cooperation, and they represent the nucleus of force armed intense, to serve the GCC countries, and the support of the Arab nation.

The first Lieutenant-General Khaled bin Sultan, said, in his book "Desert Warrior":

"The Gulf War proved" the urgent need for strong collective defenses, in the Gulf region ... it is the security point of view, is the Kingdom, and its neighbors from the Gulf states, both integrated ... even if there was a military integration between the Kingdom and the Gulf states, to form the all powerful bloc, we are better to be able to defend ourselves, but we had the political weight, at the level of the region, but worldwide. The collective security, at the level of the Gulf States ... is imposed by the current circumstances, that the kingdom plays a prominent role, because of their greater potential and more numerous and several forces.

The crisis has taught us, that the defenses Gulf, the form in which it was in 1990, the defenses totally inadequate to face the aggression of Saddam. Was not force "Peninsula Shield", the military wing of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, to the extent that a strong position to deter or respond to Iraq, alone. Hence, the importance of revision of the collective defense arrangements appears.

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The solution, in my view, lies not in the strength of such force, "Peninsula Shield", which was formed on the basis of political considerations, no less important than military considerations. Nor is, likewise, in a large army, made up of the GCC countries, the power of suggestion than 100 thousand men. At the level of fact, rule out the approval of the Member States to allocate the best subdivision, in a sustainable way, for the formation of such a regional defense force. Where then will be deployment of this force? And who will finance it, by food supply?

...

Therefore, the establishment of a joint military command, it is based in Riyadh, appointed by the professional officers, from the highest levels. That do not join any military forces, permanently, to this leadership, but all the strength left in it, it will be called only when the implementation of joint exercises or face the dangers.

In the case of war, be a permanent task of leadership, is the practice of operational leadership to the GCC forces, to deter any possible aggression, or defeat any hostile action. In the case of peace, so the driving task risks assessment. Achieve coordination between forces. Advise the Member States, the establishment of a joint center for communications, intelligence and military operations. One of the first tasks of such leadership, determine the military contribution of each Member State, in detail.

In sum, the security of the Gulf depends first: on the strength of the Kingdom of Saudi. Second, the military integration between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Third, the mutual support relationships with a number of countries, the Arab and Islamic, in the Gulf region, to defuse the crisis, which generate risks to our security. Fourth: The Western allies, whom the Gulf needs their support, in cases of extreme necessity, as a last resort, as happened in the Gulf War the second, 1990. If the Gulf has adopted them in the recent past, they have to bear in mind; they may be reluctant to support the Gulf in the future, unless it comes to the core interests. "

The subject of the composition of the force was not raised in the foreign countries of the Damascus Declaration ministers' meeting in Doha in September 1992, which was intended to discuss the mechanisms of implementation of the Damascus Declaration. It is certain that the GCC countries have dismissed the idea of preference in the light of the bilateral security arrangements.

IV. The current security challenges and the need for a joint military force (Gulf-Arab).

Since the beginning of the current decade, the pace of political developments and security variables accelerated in the Middle East dramatically; forcing indicators and the harbingers of a clear point of a fundamental change in the nature of interests and the quality of alliances that can be formed in the region in general, and the Arab world in particular.

Arab countries have become, particularly the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), is facing growing threats to national and regional stability and security, and turned to the potential challenges looming certain risk.

The most important threats of these can be summarized in the following:

- The expansion of Iranian influence in the region and its extension to the immediate vicinity of the Gulf States; north in Iraq, and further south in the side of the Arabian Peninsula, security in Yemen, which reflects the trend of dominance clear to Tehran, expressed by Mr. Ali Yonsej the counselor of the Iranian President Hassan Rohani- saying : "Iran has already become an empire with its capital in Baghdad, which is our civilization and our culture and our identity Center today as it was throughout history.

In addition to senior Iranian officials statements about the direct support of the Tehran rebel group al-Huthi (Ansar Allah) in Yemen, and Yemeni considered the group a copy of the Lebanese Hezbollah. As well as the Iran's interference in national state policy of the Gulf States.

Iran did not stop at this point; the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian spoke about the existence of "security interests" of his country in Yemen, and stressed that it "will not allow exposing these interests at risk.

This calls for "Iranian threat" rampant Gulf stand firm in order to restore the strategic balance in the region; and through the formation of an alliance Gulf-Arabic expanded, especially in the absence of the role of the Iraq-even to present, as a balanced regional traditional to Iran in connection with the security of the Gulf.

- The threat of terrorism; especially with the rapid and sudden rise of some extremist organizations that have become pose an existential national state challenge, and has become a source of threat to the stability of the region, both internally and externally; as an organization the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, known in the media as "Daash".

The dangers of terrorism except security - in his threat to political stability, national identity and social cohesion. There are several reasons require from the Gulf Cooperation Council building and devote regional and international alliances States; in view of what these threats of attributes; the most important of these threats:

- Geo-strategic spatial extension of direct and indirect repercussions of these threats, and overcome geographical boundaries of a single state, to the near and distant neighbors in both countries.

- expanse of time and the potential effects of these risks, and overcome the present to the future; making financial and political cost of any single state power beyond, and requires handedness and collective cooperation to overcome them.

Accordingly , these threats and risks calls for the Gulf states to reconsider the nature of the military alliances of existing and potential, with Arab, regional and international powers, in addition to strengthen consultation and coordination and cooperation Gulf-Gulf Cooperation Council in the framework of the Gulf system.

Gulf States has been engaged already in many of the security, political and military alliances in order to address those risks; and in this context it was joining the GCC international coalition countries to the fight against terrorism led by the United States of America, which was announced to meet the organization "Daash" in August / August 2013.

As for the Gulf States Initiative preferred launch of Arab coalition Islamic led by Saudi Arabia to return legitimacy to Yemen; representatives in the process of ""; that its military operations lasted 27 days during the period from March 26 / March to 21 of April / April 2015.

In the same context, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has welcomed the recent Arab summit held in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt during on 28, 29 March 2015, a resolution concerning the establishment of a joint Arab military force to meet the challenges that have become threatening to Arab national security.

Consideration could be given to this force or as a permanent mechanism of Arab military cooperation, but did not live up to be an alliance that the Gulf States and the Arab countries in the Middle East still need for such alliances that will help in maintaining National security in the face of threats to the challenges from every direction.

"Firmness storm "as a model of successful regional alliances.

"Firmness storm" process led by Saudi Arabia formed a model of regional Gulf of successful alliances in the face of risks and security threats.

It can be said: This operation is an example of military alliances that could make the GCC countries taking the lead formation and join them; and even leadership.

This new alliance has represented a historic turning point in the field of regional and international contemporary in the entire Arab world alliances; it is an Arabic-Islamic expanded alliance of international support; where limited international support as announced on the attribution of intelligence and logistical by the United States of America, in addition to the UN Security Council Resolution (2216); by the International Organization under Chapter VII of the Charter; which gave the coalition additional international coverage ; from here alliance can be seen as a " Firmness storm " is an ideal introduction for building interests of Arab and Gulf regional system in the first place.

On the other hand, a closer look reveals the responses of the international powers to the " firmness storm ". To a certain extent this process represents a strategic shift qualitatively not only at the level of regional relations in the region; - but at the level of the ability of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to take "The position of the initiator" in order to protect its interests and security from external threats depending on their own ability, and good investment to its soft power in mobilizing some of the regional powers with a strategic counterweight to join this alliance.

The best evidence of that, referred to the US ambassador in Kuwait -MR / Douglas Suleiman that "firmness storm" prove the ability of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to carry out the necessary steps to protect itself and defend its security.

The Iranian position is anxious to avoid escalation over the Gulf States, at least in this stage - Tehran recognizes and reveals that "firmness Storm" represents an expanded regional alliance led by Saudi Arabia; it can be directed to deter Tehran's growing influence in the region.

In general, "firmness storm" has laid the vital foundations to form an Arabic-Islamic coalition under an international shelter, and launched the Arab countries a strong practical indication of the self-power potential, and at the heart of the Gulf States, including requiring putting strategic insights and thought in terms of re-Arab self-discovery, reservoirs strengths, and work to be activated again.

Lessons learned from the contemporary Gulf and Arab alliances.

Contemporary experience has seen the participation of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and other Arab countries in several alliances, have taken multiple forms and patterns. Some of which came in the form of an Arab-Arab alliances, or Arab-International, as the alliance of "Desert Storm" in 1991.

Arab organizations also witnessed, nationalism -such as the National Council of Cooperation of the Gulf Arabic-similar experiences; where there have been six Gulf States a unified defense strategy, also formed the Peninsula Shield forces.

In light of these different experiences, we could draw some of the lessons learned, which had to develop a Gulf move thoughtful and confident to enhance the security of the GCC countries and kept its security and stability, and safeguard the independence and sovereignty of any aggression or threat; and in the following manner:

- Non-institutional alliances are mostly subject to the balance of power between the states that falls under its banner, and seek to achieve the interests of the state or the leader of the Alliance of State and the relative weight of the influential owner in it.

This is reflected, for example, in the international coalition led by the United States against terrorism in the wake of the events of 11 September / September 2001; where Washington has invested in the coalition to protect national security, as the world continued to suffer from the consequences of terrorism.

As well as the case with the current international coalition against "Daash"; where, until now, it did not succeed in eliminating this organization, because of conflict of the interests of international and regional powers in the region, and the pursuit of all of them to invest "Daash" as a pressure on the other parties; to ensure maximum as much as possible of the current and future interests.

The acquisition of self ability and translate it a power of process, is the sole guarantor of the sponsor to maintain the security of the Gulf states and the preservation of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity; and if that were true in the past, it has become a necessity in the current time; in view of several considerations:

- The expected change of direction of the United States of America - strategic Gulf Arabic-constants to review its defense policy in general, and foreign; especially in terms of changing the priorities of this policy shift US attention to the eastern Pacific to the Middle East account.

Among what that might mean, Washington keeps its military support for its regional allies in the Middle East, the Gulf States but at the same time urging them to develop their self-defense.

- The expected shift in the nature of US-Iranian relations from conflict to cooperation; and in the wake of the signing of a final agreement on the end of June next Iranian nuclear program, and the subsequent convergence likely between Washington and Tehran of American concessions will enhance the prestige of Iran as a regional power effectively, and increase the growing influence already.

- Alliance of "firmness storm" has proven that alliances led by the international powers - which are often temporary and prone to collapse because of the vagaries of interests - Despite its importance and sometimes extreme necessary, it should not be a substitute for alliances with siblings; latter if the interests of one of the pillars, the incentives built and is increasingly becoming the fuel beyond that to stronger and stronger linkages, which granted the status of continuity and of closer development over time.

Determinants of the future of military force of the Gulf States.

It is expected that a number of factors and determinants to contribute in shaping the future of the form and nature of collective military force to Gulf Arab states; including:

- **Gulf Determinants:** The extent of success in the Gulf Arab states in achieving greater military cooperation among them, on a systematic and integrated foundations; as well as self-reliance in building its defense capabilities through a combination of advanced military technology and the qualified national cadres.

Indicators show that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has made important steps in enhancing the quality of its defense capabilities; and the announcement of the formation the Gulf unified military command may be in the near future.

Also the deal, which the State of Qatar recently announced for a fighter "Rafael" French -Alta included 100 pilot training and technical Qatari- indicates that the Gulf countries have become more mature with respect to defense issues, and it adopts an integral perspective in this regard.

- Arab **Determinant**: it is related to the nature and the internal restrictions that the effective Arab countries may be exposed that are candidates for any regional alliance (Gulf-Arabic), especially Egypt and Jordan.
- Regional and international selected **Determinants**: Related to the quality of transitions – positive or negative - that may arise on the patterns of the current relations between regional and international powers concerned with the security of the Gulf; and in particular the future of relations between Iran and the United States later signing the final planned nuclear deal by the end of the first half of this year.

Scenarios of Gulf military force.

In light of these **determinants** three scenarios for the future of collective military force to Gulf Arab states and patterns of alliances can be visualized in the coming period; and that in the following form:

-Gulf Gulf alliance: through-Gulf Gulf military cooperation system in the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council; and that in the event of the completion of the stages and steps of defense integration in accordance with the common defense strategy.

-Gulf Arabic Alliance: the Gulf States may join the joint Arab military force, and this scenario is assumed that the formation of this force will be faster than military integration between the Gulf Cooperation Council countries themselves.

-Gulf-regional expanded alliance along with the lines of "fitness storm" to form its nucleus Gulf states, as well as Yemen, the Arab countries concerned with the security of the Arab regional such as Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, the Gulf States.

The latter scenario is the closest to be achieved practically; and in the light of the relevant determinants objective data mentioned above.

V. Gulf-Iranian relations after the signing of the Iranian nuclear program.

Iran and the six world powers, reached an agreement under which aims at reducing Iran's nuclear program in return for an easing imposed sanctions, this paper examines the impact of the results of the Iranian nuclear agreement on the overall Iran's foreign relations, and what may the agreement deal of impact on the conflict files, and probably in the Middle east region. This paper assumes that the Iranian nuclear deal, and regardless of the concerns that some Iranian spectra recorded by it, represents a strategic gain for Iran. Another hypothesis says: Without careful management of crises, the agreement will lead to further regionalization of the conflicts in the region, which may increase the severity and extension chronologically and geographically.

Iran continued emphasis on the "dismantling" of negotiations on the nuclear file and the rest of the dilemmas of the region, but that the next agreement will carry many consequences, its impact will be long and Iran's foreign relations, and regional conflict files, and how to manage them.

Accordingly, the question today is: Will the agreement lead to outputting the region of the state of chaos and build a state of stability where Iran and other regional powers will have influential role, or that the growing role of Iran as a result of the agreement would be a reason for more regional dilemmas, with a rise in the pace of the conflict in It could lead to military confrontations in which Iran will be involved directly? While there are good reasons to promote the possibility of both of which are to occur, it must be recognized that the agreement ending the Iranian nuclear crisis, but opens other crises files, thus there is an urgent need to build mechanisms to cope with these crises and risks.

The "good deal", as described by Iranian President Hassan Rohani, may not turn Iran's nuclear dossier page forever as far as open new geopolitical files, fuels and other files on the impact of the rise of Iran and the growing regional influence and role.

Terms of the agreement.

The agreement included some technical terms and, most notably.

Centrifuges: In line with the framework, which was reached in last April / agreement, Iran agreed to run about five thousand device model "IIR -1" of the 6100 device which is already installed to enrich uranium for ten years, and this is less than half Iran's current operating capacity. According to reports, "International Atomic Energy Agency," the latest report released in May /2014. Iran has about 20 thousand Centrifuge Sticky was used them almost ten thousand.

Uranium stocks: Since the first frame of agreement, which was reached in the 2013 agreement, Iran suspended uranium enrichment, which exceed the degree of fissile purity of 5%, has also "reducing the concentration" or made other treatment to its stockpile of enriched uranium operations by 20%.

According to the most recent for "Atomic Energy" report on Iran's nuclear activities, the stockpile of low-enriched uranium was 7537 kg at the end of June last. Under the final agreement, Iran is required to reduce this stock to 300 kilograms purity of 3.67 percent during the next 15 years, and the rest of the stock will be reduced to normal or concentrate uranium will be shipped abroad.

The time of production of nuclear fuel: senior Western diplomats say: calculating the time of the production of nuclear fuel, will be enough to make a nuclear weapon, which is something flexible; there are variables include whether the nuclear facilities are in direct contact with the Internet, and whether the construction of a real nuclear bomb process, and whether conversion of uranium gas to metal containing in this calculation. The United States says that, under the agreement, the time of -fuel production in Iran will be one year for a period of at least ten years.

Research and development: The agreement allows Iran to conduct research and development using the most effective centrifuge models, such as "IIR -4", and "IIR -5", and "IR-6", and "IR-8" for ten years without allowing them to accumulate enriched uranium.

Possible Military Dimensions: Although the senior diplomats believe that Iran is committed to the interim agreement signed in 2013, but it is stalling for months in an investigation conducted in parallel with the political talks, conducted by "Energy Agency" regarding weapons of mass destruction for its past nuclear activities in Iran. Under, the agency will be issued a final report regarding the weapons of mass destruction by the end of this year, the road map signed with "atomic energy" as well as the political agreement.

Re-imposing of sanctions: a mechanism so-called re-imposition of sanctions was set up, to allay fears that Iran is exploiting the situation to give up what they pledged in the agreement that the sanctions be lifted. In this part, - sanctions will be automatically re-imposed if Iran did not comply with the agreement, but the re-imposition of sanctions will be delayed for a period of 65 days under the agreement, and will continue to be imposed on the mechanism for at least ten years, and is likely a part of this exposure will be under a big criticism from opponents.

"Arak" Reactor which works with a heavy-water: the reactor which goes on with heavy water, its construction began in Iran, "Arak" area, the production of amounts of plutonium suitable for use in weapons. Under the agreement, Iran agreed to transfer the reactor so that extracted from it the ability to deal with the plutonium down to produce a bomb. And it will pour concrete in the main part of the reactor, "Arak" to stop operation.

Transparency: Iran agreed on the application, and the adoption of the Additional Protocol for "Atomic Energy" on its own comprehensive safeguards agreement. This will provide greater binding to the Agency's ability to access, but it will not be allowed to perform inspections anywhere and at any time, but will have to request prior authorization. Iran also agreed on the application of Article 3.1 required to inform the agency of any plans for the establishment of nuclear facilities.

The embargo of arms: a ban on trade of elements that might contribute to Iran's missile program, "ballistic" stands will remain for 8 years, and will also be a five-year ban on the transfer of certain types of heavy weapons.

VI. Iran internally: the intensification of competition

The internal political dynamics of Iran during the three months prior to the agreement gives a clear indication of the existence of political parties wary of the consequences of the agreement, and therefore these parties, particularly fundamentalist deputies in the Shura Council, under the leadership of the movement, they have placed pressure marked on the President Rohani and his negotiating team, despite the support this team received from the Islamic Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, throughout the negotiation rounds. Moderation stream which is led by President Hassan Rowhani, and represents an extension of the school Hashemi Rafsanjani, began under great domestic pressure, especially by the Committee on National Security and Foreign Policy in the Shura Council, which warned him of the agreement, "affect the independence of Iran", and loud the criticism of the Rohani, and the newspapers and sites close to the mainstream fundamentalist highlighting the results of a poll showing popular Rohani retreat ten degrees from what it was last year; it reached previously to 58% . This decline is related to a Rohani inability to conduct in the freedoms which promised a lot of change, and his failure to end the house arrest imposed on opposition leaders in the green movement (Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi), and the economy is still down a dossier which did not achieve much in spite of his success in lowering the inflation rate from 40% to 17%. Rowhani policy failed to today to give indications of the success of his economic plans, and after that Iran was the fourth economic power in the region in 2005 became the ninth place in 2009 and continued to fall to 14th place in 2013, which brought direct blow to the plan, "the future horizon" approved by the supreme leader and which it has promised that Iran will be the first economic power in the region in 2025.

Iranian press highlighted the results of another opinion poll confirms that 90% of the Iranian citizens do not trust the credibility of the American side, but nuclear deal. This comes with the start of the countdown for the start of preparations for the parliamentary elections to be held in February next year, and if it poured in favor of moderation stream, it will have a supportive effect for site Rohani and political status, which will affect the area to attend mainstream fundamentalist control of the Shura Council of the composition, The Council, which authorized the ratification of the nuclear deal.

Rowhani count too much on removing sanctions, but economists believe that the sanctions are responsible for only 20% of the problems of the Iranian economy, and that the positive economic results of the nuclear deal will

not be directly and quickly. Iran will achieve after removing the economic sanctions of economic growth between 3-7% but it will not be enough to solve the unemployment, which reached 14%, attributed to the problem and overcome the economic problems and other sanctions. Especially that Iran has lost a lot of revenue as a result of sanctions, and that the government needs to be for many years to redress this loss. In spite of that, the abolition of sanctions would make a difference in the structure of the Iranian economy, and directed by new trends impose serious policies regarding external investment, ownership and competitive conditions. Iran has been able to *withstand the sanctions cycle after another cycle, but the sanctions, which* affected the oil sector, damaged much of the Iranian economy, which is described as largely essential on oil revenues. Since 1996, the Iranian government began facing severe obstacles in attracting investors from abroad to Iran, especially in the oil and gas sectors, where the penal code to ban any investment company in Iran more than \$ 20 million. It is certain that the absence of foreign investment is not linked to economic sanctions only, but associated with legal and political system hinder foreign investment and put obstacles in front of it , and responds to this level an Article 81 of the Constitution, which has been severely prevent any foreign investment that would make concessions affecting the independence of Iran. The pursuit of Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani, as well as President Mohammad Khatami did not succeed over 16 years to overcome the legal obstacles that hinder investment, and the law did not succeed as well as the support and protection of foreign issued in 2002 to provide an attractive investment environment for business Foreign companies Investment, and the experience of company, "Tark Sal " was a bad example at this level; where the Revolutionary Guards forced it in judicial decision to waive the tender for the operation of the first mobile phone network in Iran which it had won it by a formal tender, and after that the company left the Iran. It will be the economy and foreign investment dossier to the conflict and rivalry between the fundamentalist power on the one hand and the reformist movement and the tide of moderation led by Rohani on the other hand, it is known that the current fundamentalist different approach from the rest of its rivals in the economic issue.

Despite the recognition of the multiplicity of causes of the Iranian economy crisis, the removal of sanctions will immediately leave future positive impact, and it is known that Iran has 100-140 billion dollars from oil revenues frozen in foreign banks. Previously, the official told Congress that that between 30 to 50 billion dollars from the proceeds of Iran will be free of frozen immediately after the signing of the agreement.

It is certain that the agreement achieves Iran's economic gains to lift the sanctions on companies and banks of Iran and the resumption of economic relations between Iran and the West and build new relationships, and Germany looks enthusiastic about it, and other Western countries and companies in the oil and gas sectors shared enthusiasm to enter the Iran market. Iran will be able to edit frozen funds as well as the return of Iran's oil exports.

This revenue will enable President Rohani , fulfilling some of the promises made by the improvement of the economic situation, which is a tangible benefits to deal with the international community, and Rohani efficiency in the negotiation file management. Therefore it will direct a large portion of the new revenues to support the state budget, and the establishment of institutions and infrastructure, and support, and increase the imports of Iran.

VII. A Vision about the future of the Iranian –West - relations.

"Constructive engagement", which entered the literature of Iran's foreign policy at the hands of Rohani- did not come away from the pursuit of "the measure and hope" stage to reform the economy and meet the needs of Iranian society and strengthen Iran's international status; it is clear that the achievement of these goals is in particular linked to calm tensions with USA and the West, as it is linked to Iran's ability to invest "influence Files" as a mediator or a party that no one can deny its role. If we start from the conviction that the preferences and priorities of the foreign policy of any state is the product of the work of the founders of systematic, comes gradually at most, the Iranian foreign policy even with the signing of the nuclear deal, will remain for a long time ranged within the general outline of the strategic priorities of the Islamic Republic. However, many indicators can be recorded as signs of change in Iranian policy under the government of Rohani; especially with regard to Iran's foreign relations, particularly the relationship with the United States of America. Although the main pillars upon which the Iranian foreign policy for decades has been a source of contention between Tehran and Washington, but it could not continue to classify dilator that prevent closer ties with the United States, and by making Iran for some implicit adjustments on a number of issues. It will be Iran's effort in this adaptation focused on preventing the Islamic Republic appears in the American policy.

But, what are the effects of the signing of the agreement on the Iranian-American cooperation and coordination? Does the agreement necessarily mean increasing coordination between the two sides with regard to issues of regional files?

The answer to these questions Comes linked to the strategies that both Tehran and Washington will follow regarding the relationship in the future. It seems the Russian model in the relationship, is likely to the American party, which is based on providing material incentives in exchange for cooperation in security matters, and happened to the Soviet Union got in exchange for security measures on the diplomatic and economic benefits, but the US goal was focused on changing the approach strategically to transform the Soviet Union, the behavior of state hostile to the partnership within a network of long-range interactions, may be a similar approach to lure Iran to the long-term shift from hostility to cooperation. And some US reports, draw a number of American strategies for dealing with Iran after the agreement, based mostly on the set of opportunities and identify risks, and is based on six main pillars:

- Strengthening the nuclear deal, an influential and long-term conditions to ensure Iran's commitment.
- Cooperation with Iran in issues of common interest, to bring stability to the Middle East on the one hand, and increase the chances of making Iran a moderate and more cooperative.
- The face of Iranian politics that conflict with the interests of the United States of America is the most important agents in the region support the policy.
- Maintaining the US administration's commitment towards its partners in the region, to deter hostile Iran and discourage America's allies from taking actions undermine stability in the region.
- Take advantage of the agreement to strengthen the rules of nuclear non-proliferation, and to prevent the other countries in the region to pursue the same policy of Iran.
- Benefit from the agreement in order to re-focus on Asia and Europe, and to increase American influence in exchange for Russia and China.
- In terms of opportunities and risks, these strategies draw up a list of the most important opportunities and risks highlighted as follows:

The issue	opportunities	The risks
Does the agreement prevents Iran's possession of a nuclear weapon?	It will prevent declared for rush order. Confidentiality will deter attempts to acquire nuclear weapons.	Non-compliance items. There are gaps enable Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
Will Iran become more stringent or moderate?	An opportunity to increase the impact of the pragmatists.	Strengthen hardliners from power after the agreement
Will the agreement help stability in the Middle East or enhance competition?	It would be a great opportunity for the cooperation of Washington and Tehran in Afghanistan and Iraq.	It will enhance competition in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. It will exacerbate the concern of Arab partners and would respond to it in their own way. The agreement will occur rift in the relationship with Israel.
Does the agreement strengthen or weaken the nonnuclear _proliferation regime?	It will put the agreement to deter new standards and mechanisms to deal with the problems of states	Will weaken the nuclear non-proliferation systems standards. It would respond countries in the region to launch nuclear programs.
would the agreement give the United States more strategic space To focus on the challenges in Asia and Europe?	It will give Washington more time, resources and flexibility in the face of challenges in Asia and Europe. More flexibility in relations with China. Maximize the chances of economic competition with China.	Strengthen the tension between the United States and Russia. China will strengthen its position in the Middle East.

Whatever is the favorite for the American political planners regarding the relationship with Tehran: The Russian model or the Chinese model, the Chinese model in a rapprochement with the United States seems popular with the Iranians, and probably an Iranian rapprochement with the United States, it will be limited political rapprochement, and exchanged of interests more than openness it to all levels; and can be placed in the context of selective cooperation; and for reasons, including: the planners of Iranian politics realize that Iranian openness toward the United States, and normalization of ties fully reveal the spacing between the revolutionary slogans and what society wants effectively, which can be considered as a negative; it reveals the fragility of the domestic situation, and look at the difference in this case between the regime and its citizens.

The future of the Iranian-Gulf relations.

Nuclear deal agreement could boost the chances of a rapprochement between Iran and the United States, and may open the way for the formation of a regional cooperation; leading to the achievement of good relations between Iran and its neighbors, and that applies to the Islamic Republic's relationship with Saudi Arabia; and this would work to ensure the flow of oil stability, which is in the interest of the United States and its friends and allies.

But this possibility corresponds by other possibility of the opinion that the agreement would give Iran greater opportunities to increase its influence and widens the margin of its involvement in a number of squares that have a loyal in doing it, such as: Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and the Arabian Gulf, and that this influence will come to influence will come into account of the most influential countries in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Therefore, Turkey will resort to adopt a foreign policy dealing with this possibility through a lot of resilience, and we will see the effects in a number of files such as the Syrian file may be highlighted. But the question is concentrated largely on the policy pursued by Saudi Arabia to compete file management and conflict with the Iranian party in accordance with these developments.

Saudi-Iranian relations after agreement

"Competition" characterizes most of the history of Iran-Saudi Arabia relations, hardly an arena in which the influence of Saudi Arabia without the presence of Iranian versus competitor. This competition takes great momentum in the Arab region. Since 2005, the competition has increased represented a pivotal clash of the "resistance" and "moderation". And taking this conflict a new dimension with the Arab revolutions, triggered in Tunisia in 2011, and intensified with the Syrian revolution, and the greater the unity with the Yemeni crisis and the alliance, "the storm of firmness" against the Houthis, and in order to "confront the Iranian tide in Yemen. The "firmness storm" is considered as unusual step since the lack of direct confrontation between the two countries ", following the conviction began to take shape amid the ranks of decision-makers in Saudi Arabia that is direct confrontation with Tehran's policy now is a conflict between the two eligible countries to reach the highest levels if the situation in Syria and Iraq continue as they are, as well as for Saudi Arabia's inability to resolve and to end what it started in Yemen.

It is clear that the nuclear deal with Iran, will not bridge the gap between it and its Arab neighbors, although no one argues that the nuclear deal, will serve as a deal in which both Tehran and Washington achieve many gains, on top of that it reduced the possibility of war against Iran and could be constitute a guarantee time for Iran's development of a nuclear weapon, as well as to restore confidence and the development of building relations between the two countries. Iran believes it has made concessions on its nuclear program to enable itself obtain gains in contrast, shows that the removal of sanctions is the contrast that it wants, mainly Iran, and if it got this demand , it will refresh its economy, its market and become a destination for investors.

Though the agreement alleviates the US threat to Iran, but that it does not apply for threats at regional level; The agreement from the point of Iran's neighbors view in the Arabian Gulf will enhance Iran's ability to dominate, and do not see that the agreement will force Iran to retreat from its policy and cooperation in the field of defense and help to deter Iran militarily. It did not help in stopping Iran's influence in the near surroundings.

In contrast, Iran has not provided would what may alleviate the fears of its Arab neighbors, and as it was locked in tough negotiations with the West over its nuclear program, it continues to build its interests in the Middle East in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. It does not appear that the nuclear deal will change in regional policy for Iran; it would not be stopped from continuing its presence in the arena of classified its task, such as Syria, Iraq and Yemen to a lesser extent. It is supposed to excessive optimism at this level and expect less Iranian role in this conflict fronts; as there is no indication that the agreement includes provisions flowing in this direction.

In the face of the great threat posed by organizations such as the "organization of the Islamic state" to Iran, Iran has been pursuing a confrontation with the deepest dimensions of policy; it will continue its support for armed groups and non-state actors. In exchange for this policy, the Arab Gulf states will also seek to find new ways to confront Iran, especially with the start of form that it has a conviction no longer possible to rely on the US ally as before, and will be paid to the promotion of "proxy war option." And this increases the risk of geopolitical conflict, sectarian tonnage loaded, in which each party is accusing the other as practiced sectarian policy. While Iran does not seem willing to recognize the seriousness of what can leave it on the results of the future of the region, its Arab neighbors in the Gulf, see the decline in the sectarian conflict depends on stopping Iran ambition as a regional power. This cargo holds sectarian conflict in the region and makes an order to reach settlements in the Syrian and Iraqi dilemma of Yemen which is very difficult.

THE GCC-Russian Relations and its role in the region.

Some speculation talked about Iran after the nuclear deal, it can be bartered friendship with Moscow, in exchange for preferential treatment from Washington; it is what we will see manifestations in the Middle East files. There are contradictory and divergent analyzes on the role of Russia in the nuclear negotiations, there is

talk of a big role for Russia in the success of the negotiations, while others talk about Russian political emotional on this issue.

And you can understand the nature of the Russian approach of this issue in accordance with the following data:

- It is not in the interest of Russia that Iran possesses of nuclear weapons or the capacity to develop a nuclear weapon, nuclear agreement enhances the security of the Russian.
- Russia categorically opposed the use of force in resolving the Iranian nuclear problem, both through the air and missile strikes, sabotage and attacks on websites, or any other means.
- Russia does not support the imposition of unilateral or multilateral sanctions against Iran, demanding lifting of these sanctions.

And if the West chose not to engage with Iran in economic projects after the nuclear deal, it will be a great opportunity for Russia, which will benefit from the political and economic influence, to build more partnerships with Iran, and begins Features of this partnership to emerge, and most notably Russia's decision to hand over Iran's defense system (S-300), which was reluctant to be delivered by the international sanctions imposed on Iran, would be a precursor to many of the arms deals as soon as the lifting of sanctions with Iran, especially the big need for modern weapons. Russia intends to build a long-term military relationship with Iran and the quantity of Iranian purchases of Russian weapons in the period (1991-2015) to 304 billion dollars. In terms of trade, the structure of the statements says the two sides increase the volume of trade exchange between them from 5 billion to \$ 70 billion annually. In 2014 Russia and Iran signed an agreement for the construction of a new stage in the Bushehr reactor, and will continue to cooperate in the field of nuclear technology between Iran and Russia.

In total, much of the security, economic and military advantages could be achieved by Russia as a result of the nuclear deal, it will not be agreement prohibitive for further Russian-Iranian cooperation in the Middle East, as well as in the Caucasus region and Central Asia, despite international competition in that region. Without a major political shift in the relationship between the West and Iran, the Russian-Iranian relations will be stronger and will happen a large Russian-Iranian coordination in a number of Middle East files.

The agreement, China and the Silk Road.

Iran is a geo-strategically important for China in respect of reorientation toward the West, and the nuclear deal would be an important factor for the strengthening of bilateral relations between Iran and China, and their cooperation in a number of areas, which will have consequences for the United States strategies in Asia and the Middle East.

During the year 2014 ,trade between Iran and China, amounted to \$ 50 billion in size, and this is at least the size of the US-China trade at 11 times. During the recent years, and despite a drop in China's imports of Iranian oil due to sanctions, China has remained to buy half of Iran's oil production at low prices. Apart from the diplomatic relations, the geo-strategic importance represented by each state to the other is the key to understanding the relationship. Just as important for Iran to China and orientation to the west, China to Iran is very important central role for Washington in Asia and the US maritime superiority. In armament side China has provided assistance to Iran in building Iran's missile program, which was a source in the construction of Iran's defense system.

Within this geo-strategic dimension in the relationship, the revival of the Silk Road, which has become "an important feature of the current Chinese foreign policy attributes" paints landmarks future relations between China and Iran through a project?

Belt of Economic Silk Road.

In September 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping, announced in a speech in Kazakhstan, what he called: Economic Belt Silk Road "a new initiative in foreign policy, aimed at strengthening the bonds of international cooperation and common development in various parts of Eurasia." China presents five specific objectives of this project: to promote economic cooperation, and to improve the ways of the road link, to encourage trade and investment, facilitate currency converter and support exchanges between peoples operations. It is due to make a priority for the Silk Road to China for three reasons:

Ensure the flow of energy through the land route from Central Asia and Russia, to reduce the sea routes risk; where it reaches through the Strait of Malacca, which is the conduit for 80% of the energy that link China and the Strait of Hormuz and expresses it 40% of China's imports of oil.

Development project to calm the western sector of China is stable and energy-rich, in order to prevent Uighur claims of secession and the establishment of the State of East Turkistan.

Find the groundwork for stability and unity of the region which will make China an economic and political nucleus in it.

What is the importance of Iran in the Silk Road?

During the past years, Beijing has adopted a policy where a lot of measures to modernize the vast network of roads, railways overlapping between the Central Asian countries; which is investment in infrastructure in the region, and has pursued Iran the same private policy through the construction of roads and railways with a number of countries in the forefront of Turkmenistan, and made China's funding of the Silk Road in 2012, and includes a railway line built to reach them, Kazakhstan, Russia, and at a later stage with the West, and the railroad parallel with the railway line that passes through Xinjiang province, leading to Alma Ataa, the largest city in Kazakhstan.

Such a path that aims to link east and west that opens the door towards the Gulf region. In all, China aims to transfer power from the eastern Bank to the center of Eurasia, and thus can deal with marine issues that may arise during the transfer of power, and eventually reduce the US naval superiority, and it seems that Russia and Iran support the policy.

The importance of Iran's strategy in this project as a bridge between East and West, and although there are other bridges, but the Iranian route is the most important among them.

The nuclear deal, will launch China's hand in building the overland route that it wants to cooperate with Iran, and in return will enter Iran's full membership in the SCO member; as international sanctions pause obstacle to achieving this in the past. And it started this organization gives several indications that it will be a major competitor of the United States of America in that region.

The GCC-Indian Relations and its role in the region.

Iran received a formal request from the Indian government that includes increasing its imports of Iranian oil, if the signature of a comprehensive nuclear agreement on Iran's nuclear program and ease sanctions. And increased India's imports of Iranian crude 42% in the past year compared to the year 2013 with the increase in purchases of Indian refiners to take advantage of the easing of sanctions imposed on Tehran over its as a result of its nuclear program .India intensive efforts largest consumers of energy in the world as one to conclude deals on better terms for its companies with the Petroleum Exporting Countries. India is considered the fourth-largest oil consumer, the fourth largest importer in the world, about 80 percent of its crude and a third and increases the demand for fuel with rapid economic growth. India recorded an economic growth outpaced China in the past year and reached 7.3%. During the first three months of this year, it recorded an economic growth reached 7.5% higher than the growth in China with 7%.

It seems that the economic and energy came in top of the Iranian-Indian relations file, and looks the priorities of India are to strengthen its relations with Iran based on economic sectors, including trade, energy and transport, though political relations take other dimensions where Iran facilitated to India access to Afghanistan, which it sees as Pakistan's security threat . It is expected to boost the nuclear deal from a private maritime relations between Iran and India with the presence of some of the projects that have been hampered by sanctions, and in the month of last May, India and Iran signed an agreement to develop the Shah Bahar port in southeastern Iran, a port overlooking the Gulf of Oman, near the Iranian border with Pakistan. Pakistan does not seem satisfied with the project as the run of the two baths allow Afghanistan to open up to the sea port for not overlooking any Sea, which would reduce its dependence on Pakistan ,this will also give India access to Afghanistan without the need for passage of Pakistan. India has already agreed with Iran in 2003 on the development of the port of Shahbahar , but the project has not made any progress due to Western sanctions against Iran.

VIII. Conclusions and Results

This paper discussed whether the agreement over Iran's nuclear program will lead to the construction of a state of stability to Iran and other regional powers to have influential role, or whether it will lead to the growing Iranian role that may cause more regional dilemmas, with a rise in the frequency of conflict that might lead to military confrontations, and wars of Iran would be involved in directly. It is argued in the paper the reasons which enhance the possibility of the occurrence of any of the two. A number of conclusions and findings on the effects of the agreement on the position of Iran, Iran's regional and international relations can be included as follows:

The agreement will end the Iranian nuclear crisis, but it will open other crises files, thus there is an urgent need to build mechanisms to cope with these crises and risks.

Iranian interior level: a team believes that the positive economic consequences of the nuclear deal will not be directly and quickly. It will bring Iran after the removal of sanctions economic growth of between 3-7%, but it will not be enough to solve the problem of unemployment (14%) and exceeded other economic problems, especially that Iran has lost a lot of revenue as a result of sanctions, and that the government needs many years to redress this loss.

Other team sees that the removal of sanctions will leave a positive impact directly on the future of the Iranian economy, and it is known that Iran has 100-140 billion dollars of the frozen oil revenues in foreign banks, and there are between 30 to 50 billion dollars from Iran's frozen revenues that will be freed immediately after the signing of the agreement.

The abolition of sanctions would make a difference in the structure of the Iranian economy, and it will be directed to new trends that impose serious policies regarding external investment, ownership and competitive conditions.

Economic View and foreign investment will a conflict file between the mainstream and fundamentalist stream of moderation led by Rohani, especially that each stream has a different approach at this level.

At the level of the Iranian-American relations, the question arises about the effects of the signing of the agreement on cooperation and Iranian American coordination, and does not necessarily mean increasing coordination between the two sides with regard to issues of regional files agreement? The answer to these questions comes linked to the strategies to be pursued by both Tehran and Washington regarding the relationship in the future, and it seems that the Russian model in the relationship, will be likely to the American side .

There are a number of US strategies to deal with Iran after the agreement, based mostly on the set of opportunities and identify risks.

Iran favors the Chinese model in dealing with the United States, and it prefers limited political rapprochement and exchanged more than open to all levels of interests; and this can be placed in the context of "parallel selective cooperation."

The agreement could open the way for the formation of a regional cooperation; leading to the achievement of good relations between Iran and its neighbors, and that applies to the Islamic Republic's relationship with Saudi Arabia; and this would work to ensure a stable flow of oil, which is in the interest of the United States and its friends and allies.

The opposite to the prior possibility may occur; The agreement would give Iran greater opportunities to increase its influence and widens the margin of its involvement in a number of squares that have a loyal in doing it, such as: Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and the Arabian Gulf, and will come on behalf of influential account on a number of influential countries in the account the region, particularly Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

The agreement from the point of view of Iran's neighbors in the Persian Gulf will enhance Iran's ability to dominate.

The question is largely Concentrated on the policy pursued by Saudi Arabia to manage the competing file conflict with the Iranian side in accordance with these developments, there may be a conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia which is qualified to reach the highest levels if the situation in Syria and Iraq continues as it is, as well as Saudi Arabia's inability to resolve and finish what It started in Yemen.

It does not seem that the nuclear deal will be changed in the regional policy of Iran; it would not be stopped from continuing its presence in the arena of its classified task, such as Syria, Iraq, and Yemen and to a lesser extent.

Iranian-Russian relations: if the West chose not to engage with Iran in economic projects after the nuclear deal, it will be a great opportunity for Russia, which will benefit from the political and economic influence, and build more partnerships with Iran.

Russia is looking forward to a lot of security, economic and military advantages that can be achieved by Russia as a result of the nuclear deal.

The agreement will not be an obstacle for further Russian-Iranian cooperation in the Middle East, as well as in the Caucasus region and Central Asia, despite international competition in that region.

Without a major political shift in the relationship between the West and Iran, the Russian-Iranian relations will be the strongest.

Iran-China relations: Iran is a geo-strategically important for China in respect of reorientation toward the West, and the nuclear deal would be an important factor for the strengthening of bilateral relations between Iran and China.

Within the geo-strategic dimension in the relationship, the revival of the Silk Road Project is "an important feature of the current Chinese foreign policy attributes", and cancellation of penalties will free the two countries from the constraints that were impeding a lot of projects on transport and energy.

The importance of Iran's strategy in this project as a bridge between East and West, and despite the existence of other bridges for China, but the Iranian route is the most important of them and the most economically feasible.

Regarding India, the nuclear deal will increase its imports of Iranian oil, where it has made a formal request so if the signature of agreement and easing of sanctions occurred.

It is expected to boost the nuclear deal from the special maritime relations between Iran and India with the presence of some of the projects that have been hampered by the sanctions, particularly the Shah Bahar port overlooking the Gulf of Oman.

In sum, the agreement represents a strategic gain for Iran, it enhances the regional position, and without careful management of crises, the agreement will lead to further regionalization of the conflicts in the region, which may increase the severity and extension chronologically and geographically.

Regional and international transformations and current balances and those that are still in progress, of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, Require crystallizing a unified strategy, to strengthen its cooperation regionally and internationally, in order to lay the foundations of security and stability in this critical region internationally.

It is important that this vision and strategic Gulf based on the number of pillars in the forefront: the construction and consecration of the capacity of the power of self collection; and the preservation of the incubator Arab to the Gulf force, and strengthen cooperation with regional allies actors; and finally secure the international, legal and political support and intelligence.

Here we see that the concept of national security, and especially the Arab Gulf region. the nation considers that its national security is solid and kept standing steadfastly against any attempt to breakthrough if it can provide sufficient capacity of the elements of self-defense to repel, any sense of protection, and prevention and then possible to threat deterrence against any attempt to penetrate or impose hegemony by force, and by the coalition in order to reach the nation for solid safeguard fence for its national security which must be the achievement of the elements of the natural defense and the case of harmony demographic situation and social of the population in terms of affiliation to the nation and their customs, language and history, on the one hand and harmony geographical regarding its location in the world and somewhat geographical and climatic unity. If these things are achieved ,fence construction of the security which is consisted of three main elements of a political system which its strength is based on two main factors :economy and military power that depends on force or measured by the concept of geopolitics scientists [earth policy] under the theory of the triangle right-angled isosceles where tendon represents politics and the equal sides represent the military and economic ability of the nation's political nutshell respectively, here is estimated to engineering holds the forced combination of both military force and economic Whenever outcome was greater the higher the capacity and the political become one of the urgent need for cooperation of political, economic and military alliance. And thus national security fence has become stronger in the preservation and protection of the capabilities of the nation, and repel any penetration or an attempt to impose hegemony by force and maintains the dignity and pride.

It should be noted that there is a so-called strategic threat to Arab national security. This type is the threat to the security of Arab nationalist first from within any of the inside the Arab nation which is simply an inability to agree or attempt to agree on a lower grade of strategic coordination with each other in spite of the existence of a body strategy that includes all the Arabs and founded a long time ago in 1946, which is The Arab League.

Here I would like to mention the role of the Israel's arm in the region, which indirectly operates by its customers and its influence in the Western world, affecting many of the wealth of the Arab nation, as well as well as its option nuclear threat - and then the influence and domination of the new world order on the region - and finally the sensitivity of Arab regimes to each other to the degree of mistrust .This factor has significantly exacerbated recently after the last Gulf War. We are living in a new world war ended the cold between the socialist camp and the capitalist camp Democratic after Walt leadership following the end of this war camp capitalist Democratic-led by the United States the world leader and West has crystallized the conflict into International Modern world or came close to Galloway clearly a conflict of nationalities, doctrines and sectarianism which is supported by the weight of global economic that is imposed on the Arab nation which require Speed efforts to face this new challenge and threat to its national security, mindful that the Arab countries and especially the Arab Gulf . This requires uniting the Arab nation and to be away from all political and individual differences for achieving its high National interests.

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